ECE 368---CAD Based Logic Design

Instructor: Prof. Shantanu Dutt

Important Information:

1. M/W/F 2-2:50pm, 219 TH. 
   
   
2. Instructor's office hrs (930 SEO): W 5:30-6:30 pm, F 3:30-4:30 pm. 
   
   
3. TA: Soumya Banerjee, [e-mail] 
   TBA 
   
   
4. Before the next lecture, remember to always go through the material covered in the previous lecture and make sure you understand it all. Ask Qs to TAs and me during office hours, and possibly in the next lecture. 
   
   
5. Always do the given reading assignment for the class in which it will be needed. This way you'll get the most out of that lecture; otherwise you may not understand much of it. The reading assignments generally cover background material from pre-requisite courses or some nitty-gritty details like program syntax that are self explanatory. 
   
   
6. Syllabus: pdf 
   
   
7. A possible VHDL PC software along with an introductory VHDL tutorial: VHDL s/w and tutorial link 
   
   
8. Other useful VHDL sources: 
   
   (1) VHDL FAQs, etc. 
   
   (2) On-line resources of the Ashenden textbook 
   
   
9. Quartus Schematic Capture Based Simulation Tool: pdf 
   
   
10. VHDL Language Reference Manual: Not available at this time 
    
    
11. Lecture Notes 
    
    
12. Lab instructions for setting up the Synopsys VHDL software and running it (for your lab assignments) (pdf). 
    IGNORE html instr as indicated (pdf is more recent version) + Source codes. 
    
    
13. X Windows simulation tool (courtesy of Kevin Green) 
    
    
14. UNIX Tutorial for Beginners 
    
    
15. The Synopsys Design Compiler introductory document prepared by Li Li is here (pdf) . 
    The source files used in the example of this document is here (tarred and gzipped file) . 
    Restore the above file using commands: 
    "gunzip bcd4to7seg.tar.gz" 
    "tar -xvf bcd4to7seg.tar" 
    NOTE: After the above commands are executed, you will have the source VHDL files in a sub-dir. called "files"; so make sure you do NOT already have such a sub-directory where you have copied the bcd4to7seg.tar.gz file. 
    
    
16. The Synopsys Design Vision introductory document prepared by Soumya Banerjee is here (pdf) . 
    The VHDL source files used in the two examples of this document are: ck1.vhd and fsm.vhdl 
    

سورس استاکس

سورس کرم استاکس

سایت مناسبی برای سورس کدهای بدافزارها

Heads of the Hydra. Malware for Network Devices

Network devices such as routers, access points and DSL modems are an integral part of today's home and small office networks. Typically, these devices will have been provided by a user’s ISP or bought to extend a user’s existing infrastructure and are usually managed by people who do not have any special technical knowledge. Often poorly configured and vulnerable, such devices are an easy target for network-based attacks, allowing cybercriminals to quickly and easily gain control over a network. Surprisingly perhaps, these seemingly innocuous devices can also offer a perfect hiding place for malware.

• Introduction
  • Main security issues
  • Attacks: reasons and consequences
  • Watch your DNS!
• Exploiting vulnerabilities
  • CSRF and drive-by pharming
  • UPnP: very friendly, very dangerous
  • SNMP: yet another (hidden) feature
• Binary malware
  • Hydra: an open source prototype of router malware
  • Psyb0t: the first in-the-wild malware targeting the MIPS platform
    • Technical details
    • Proliferation
    • Commands
  • Uteltend: In nome di Chuck Norris
  • Tsunami: the Hydra's new head
  • Disinfection process
• Conclusions

Introduction

Main security issues

The weakest link in any IT security chain is in fact the user, and this holds true for network threats and devices also. It's obvious that a highly trained and competent administrator can provide resilient protection for most networks, while someone without the necessary experience and training can easily expose network users to significant risk. Big companies that manage huge numbers of users typically have expensive professional networking equipment and hire qualified and experienced network specialists. However, small businesses with 10-15 workstations can hardly be expected to buy expensive hardware and employ a network professional. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that those with a router or modem at home will be in the least bit familiar with network management - it's like expecting every single computer user to be an IT professional. Home users generally assume that everything will work just as it should, relying on a device's default settings without referring to complex technical manuals. Therefore network providers and hardware vendors need to be aware of their responsibilities in maintaining network security on the devices they sell.

Protecting SCADA devices from threats and hackers

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control many of the crucial services our modern society depends upon such as electric power distribution, water treatment, natural gas and oil pipelines, hydroelectric dams, traffic lights, train switching systems, building controls, and many others. 

Because of its critical role in controlling these systems, security for SCADA systems is a high priority, but many legacy SCADA devices that were designed without security measures are now being connected to the Internet.  These devices also lack the ability to detect and report traffic abnormalities, probes or attacks, or to manage and control security policies.   While newer systems may include improved security, many SCADA devices remain deployed for 10 years or more, often in remote areas, resulting in very slow migration to newer, more secure devices.

In addition to system level security issues, SCADA protocols themselves are often inherently insecure. They may lack basic security measures. Instead they often rely on “security by obscurity” or on isolation from public networks for security. Without security measures such as authentication and encryption, the underlying protocols provide an easy avenue for hackers wishing to attack SCADA devices.

SCADA networks 

SCADA systems are often complex networks with multiple components.  These systems may be fully automated, where all control is performed by computers, fully manual, where control is performed by human operators, or a hybrid system, where some control is performed automatically and some is performed by human operators.  To perform all of these functions, many SCADA systems include:

Field interface devices  –  Sensors detecting and reporting power levels, flow rates, temperature, pressure, and local control devices such as motor controls, valve actuators, and control switchboxes.

Operating equipment  –  Motors, pumps, automated factory systems, and valves controlled by the SCADA network.

Control computers  –  Embedded computers or dedicated PCs receiving information from the sensor networks, reporting this information to the management systems and controlling the associated operating equipment.  These computers may make decisions automatically based on the information derived from sensors, or may relay commands received from management computers. 

Management computers  –  Computer terminals with an HMI (Human Machine Interface) connected to the SCADA network. These computers provide an interface for operators to monitor and control the devices on the SCADA network.

Networked communication (local and remote)  –  SCADA networks use a variety of communication technologies.  Serial communication, USB or proprietary wired networks are used for short range communication. Ethernet, TCP/IP, Wi-Fi, dial-up networking, cellular packet data and other methods are used for long range communication.  Increasingly, SCADA networks utilize the Internet for long range communications and remote access.

Interconnection to business process systems  –  Frequently, SCADA networks are connected to corporate networks to allow them to interconnect with business process systems.

Tenselica re-configurable processors

About Tensilica
Tensilica was founded in July 1997 to address the growing need for optimized, application-specific microprocessor solutions in high-volume embedded applications. With a configurable and extensible microprocessor core called Xtensa, Tensilica is the only company that has automated and patented the time-consuming process of generating a customized microprocessor core along with a complete software development tool environment, producing new configurations in a matter of hours. For more information, visit www.tensilica.com.

Xtensa LX allows extension to the processor through Tensilica Instruction Extension (TIE) language which is similar to VHDL. It supports new instructions and registers, execution units and I/O ports.

آموزش اکسپلویت نویسی

آموزش اکسپلویت نویسی

New Course "Hardware Trojan Detection and Prevention" will be Offered at UCONN by CHASE Faculty

New Course "Hardware Trojan Detection and Prevention" will be Offered at UCONN by CHASE Faculty,  Prof. Domenic Forte, Spring 2014

Course Description: Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made to original IC designs that reduce system reliability and security (changes to functionality, leakage of private data, etc.). With the potential for ICs containing Trojans to end up in commercial or military systems, there has been substantial interest not only in academia, but also in governmental agencies and industry to detect and prevent Trojan insertion. ECE 6095 - 005 is a graduate-level advanced-topics course that intends to help students:

• Understand the challenges and impact of hardware Trojans.
• Familiarize themselves with existing state-of-the-art research in the area.
• Build a foundation of knowledge in overlapping areas such as signal processing, detection, and estimation theories.
• Evaluate existing methods, improve upon them, and develop new research techniques for hardware Trojan detection and prevention.
• Improve reading, writing, and presentation skills.

Topics to Be Covered:

• Basics of VLSI design, synthesis, fabrication, and test
• Introduction to hardware Trojans, Trojan taxonomy, and mitigation taxonomy including destructive, design-time, test-time, and run-time
• Systematic methods of Trojan insertion
• Post-silicon detection of Trojans
• Destructive: Reverse-engineering
• Nondestructive: Functional tests
• Nondestructive: Side-channel analysis
• Test-time vs. run-time
• Embedded sensors: timing, power, temperature
• Pre-silicon detection/prevention of Trojans
• Design-for-security (DFS) based methods for Trojan detection
• Formal verification and Proof Carrying Code (PCC)
• Signal Processing, Estimation, and Detection Theory
• Filtering-based estimation: Kalman filter, Extended Kalman filter, Particle filter
• Introduction to detection theory: Hypothesis Testing, Neyman Pearson Theorem, Minimum Probability of Error and Bayes Risk
• Potential applications in Trojan problem

____________________________________

publications of Mr Forte is attractive. check them.

سورس کد فایلهای آلوده

یک سایت برای سورس کد فایلهای آلوده به زبان های مختلف از جمله اسمبلی

PTscalar For ARM

Mona Jalal

Preparing for TOEFL iBT, GRE General and DELF B1 for the next two month, meanwhile preparing my project presentation and working on a Novel Reliable NoC Mapping algorithm and Importing more realistic power models into a PTscalar which has ARM ISA.

This Article used too.

http://www.jwhitham.org/simplescalar/

فیلم آموزشی داده کاوی با نرم افزار Weka

آموزش کار با وکا فارسی(وب پیج):

داده‌کاوی با WEKA (قسمت اول)

آموزش

Weka Tutorials

For custom data mining help contact us at our gmail account william 108. There is not a space. Some basic Statistics videos are atwww.sentimentmining.net/StatisticsVideos 
Some videos on the R programming language for Statistical Computing are athttp://sentimentmining.net/StatisticsWithR/

• 1

  Getting Weka

  Watch Download
• 2

  Introduction to Text Mining

  Watch Download